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Article
Who Decides on Liberty?
THOMAS P. CROCKER
Whether approached as a matter of executive discretion, judicial role,
or individual rights, questions about security are never far removed from
questions about liberty. Tradeoffs between liberty and security often seem
unavoidable. Defenders of unbounded executive power argue that security
relies on experts to whom citizens and courts alike must defer. But, if the
tradeoff between security and liberty is to be a real weighing of the risks,
costs, benefits, burdens, and consequences of various policy decisions,
then who has the necessary expertise to decide on liberty? After all, to
make decisions about the appropriate balance between security and liberty
implies that a decision-maker be an expert not only about security, but also
about liberty. Otherwise, the idea of a balanced tradeoff is empty, either
citizens and courts have non-exclusive authority to decide on both, or
courts must grant executive officials expansive deference on matters of
both security and liberty. This Article argues that the latter proposition is
untenable and that, therefore, citizens and courts must have non-exclusive
authority to make decisions about both national security and individual
liberty. But nowhere in American constitutional traditions and practice
can we find unchecked executive authority over matters of liberty. As a
consequence, we should expect institutionally allocated authority over both
liberty and security. Apart from the special knowledge citizens and courts
might have about particular matters of liberty, an interest in allocating
authority over questions of liberty is in part justified by the harms of
concentrated decision-making a polity seeks to avoid. Advocates of
unbounded executive authority argue that concern over tyranny is a
phobia. Against this view, this Article argues that far from emotional
responses to crises, American constitutional culture disperses authority
over both liberty and security as a constitutive feature of constrained
political practice.
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Who Decides on Liberty?
THOMAS P. CROCKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether approached as a matter of executive discretion, judicial role,
or individual rights, questions about security are never far removed from
questions about liberty. We are often told that there must be a tradeoff
between liberty and security. As Jeremy Waldron described the ubiquity
of this claim, "[t]alk of a liberty/security balance has become so common
that many view it as just an ambient feature of our political environment."1
Despite the purported equivalence of these two values, this tradeoff is
seldom framed with reasons to adopt policies that make us more insecure
to achieve the benefits of greater freedom. If "it has become part of the
drinking water in this country that there has been a trade off of liberty for
security, ' 2 this is because talk of tradeoffs is unidirectional. Scholarly
defenses of national security expertise will argue not that we must take
care to preserve civil liberties, but "that the government must make
tradeoffs, that policy should become less libertarian during emergencies,
and that courts should stay out of the way."3
This question of tradeoffs cannot be approached without asking the
question of who decides on the proper allocation of liberty and security.
4
Defenders of unbounded executive power argue that security relies on
experts to whom citizens and courts alike must defer.5 Especially during
emergencies, executive officials are presumed to have superior information
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. J.D. Yale Law
School; Ph.D. Vanderbilt University. For helpful conversations on these issues, I would like to thank
Josie Brown and Josh Eagle, and for raising the question, I am indebted to Aziz Rana. I am also
grateful for the excellent research assistance of William McKinney and Zachary Horan.
1 JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND TRADE-OFFS: PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE
111 (2010); see also DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING
THE WAR ON TERROR 17 (2007) ("While we agree that it is often wrong to sacrifice liberty, freedom,
and rights in the search for security, we concede that trade-offs are inevitable and that in some
circumstances sacrifices in liberty may be warranted if they can promise substantial improvements in
security.").
2 James B. Comey, Fighting Terrorism and Preserving Civil Liberties, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 403,
403 (2006).
3 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND
THE COURTS 158 (2007).
4 See Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1421-27 (2012) (tracing the
"broader ideological context that shapes how the balance between liberty and security is struck.").
5 See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 26-38.
about what is necessary to preserve security.6 According to the deference
thesis, to impose constitutional limits on executive discretion risks creating
security harms rather than enhancing freedoms. Deference to experts
means "that the executive branch, not Congress or the judicial branch,
should make the tradeoff between security and liberty.",7 When citizens,
scholars, or judges attempt to intervene in debates over the proper measure
of security, defenders of unchecked executive power claim that "they are
amateurs playing at security policy, and there is no reason to expect that
courts can improve upon government's emergency policies in any systemic
way.",8  On this view, citizens and courts lack sufficient specialized
knowledge to make optimal decisions about security. According to Judge
Richard Posner, critics of executive expertise risk erroneous tradeoffs,
because "civil libertarians tend to exaggerate the costs. . . and to ignore or
slight the benefits" of security policy.9 To interpose legal principles
protecting rights and liberties as barriers to security policy risks producing
"tangible harms,"' 0 while adding nothing relevant to expert decision
making.
Such claims are puzzling in light of the image of balancing
exemplified by blindfolded Justitia, who must weigh the relative merits of
the competing claims of liberty and security."l At the very moment talk of
balancing liberty and security becomes salient, the rhetoric shifts to the
necessity of security's priority to liberty. We are reminded of the fact that
"without physical security there is likely to be very little liberty." 12
Emergency provokes the direction of trade, for under the tradeoff thesis:
"As threats increase, the value of security increases; a rational and well-
motivated government will then trade off some losses in liberty for greater
gains in increased security.'
13
Presidential claims to expertise in matters of security are
unexceptional. What follows from these assertions are another matter.
From the founding, the President has benefitted from the claimed
6 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 17 ("The deferential view.., rests on a claim about
relative institutional competence.").71d. at 5.
8 Id. at 31.
9 RicHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY 51 (2006).
10 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 24 (arguing that "sometimes tangible security harms do
in fact occur when claims of civil liberties are respected").
1 See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1729-33 (1986).
12 POSNER, supra note 9, at 47. The philosopher Henry Shue makes a similar point, though in so
doing emphasizes the fact that it is individuals who have a right to security: "No rights other than a
right to physical security can in fact be enjoyed if a right to physical security is not protected. Being
physically secure is a necessary condition for the exercise of any other right." HENRY SHUE, BASIC
RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 21-22 (1980).
13 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 27.
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advantage that "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
characterize the proceedings of one man,"' 4 by comparison to larger
deliberative bodies when it comes to matters of security. In addition,
courts tend to defer to executive expertise under the commander-in-chief
and foreign affairs powers, especially regarding military matters.15  For
example, the Supreme Court defers to executive conclusions in security
matters because "national security and foreign policy concerns arise in
connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where
information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct
difficult to assess.' 6  Executive officials are presumed to have superior
institutional capacities to acquire and analyze information too complex and
varied to leave to democratic processes. Centralized decision-making,
combined with specialized knowledge and institutional capacities, define
the conditions for expanded presidential power that Aziz Rana traces from
the New Deal to the present.' 7 What is most notable is that the meaning of
"security" changes during the twentieth century to accommodate the
developing capacities of presidential administration. 8 "Security" becomes
a matter for experts who have access not only to specialized knowledge,
but also privileged information, rendering it possible to claim that other
academics and even judges are "amateurs"' 9 in the field of policy.
Expanding presidential power has been a source of political and academic
consternation, interrupted by occasional commendation, and driven by
never-ending large and small crises purporting to require deference to
14 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
13 See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863) ("Whether the President in
fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed
hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them
the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him," and the Court must defer to this
decision); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (recognizing
"the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations").
16 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010). The Court further
elaborates: "[W]hen it comes to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, 'the
lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked,' and respect for the Government's conclusions
is appropriate." Id. (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981)).
17 Rana, supra note 4, at 1451-58. This genealogy cuts across the political divide, finding
advocates for expanded executive power among both progressives and conservatives, who seek to
"reconstruct institutional relationships throughout American government around presidential initiative
and administrative capacity." Stephen Skrowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential
Power. A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2074-75
(2009).
I A consequence of the shifting meanings of "national security," Rana observes, is that "[t]he
modem security discourse presented an image of politics marked by uncertainty, public ignorance, and
the near continuous condition of threat or crisis." Rana, supra note 4, at 1458.
19 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 31.
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20executive expertise. If there is nothing exceptional regarding presidential
claims of unique expertise in matters of security in American legal
practice, the same cannot be said about matters of individual liberty.
If the tradeoff between security and liberty is to be a real weighing of
the risks, costs, benefits, burdens, and consequences of various policy
decisions, then who has the necessary expertise to decide on liberty? After
all, to make decisions about the appropriate balance between security and
liberty implies that a decision-maker be an expert not only about security,
but also about liberty. Otherwise, the idea of a balanced tradeoff is empty,
because it becomes nothing more than an assertion of security's priority
over liberty, combined with institutional deference to the security decisions
of executive officials. There would be a tradeoff-more security and less
liberty-but not one that involves balanced consideration of both interests.
Thus the question becomes: are decisions about the appropriate allocations
and distributions of liberty ones that executive officials necessarily have
superior knowledge and expertise to determine? To make the claim that
some baseline of liberty must give way-if the tradeoff is to be more than
a rhetorical charade-requires knowledge about how this loss of liberty
will affect people's lives through the costs it imposes, in light of the
benefits in security expected to accrue. Such knowledge must extend
beyond the slogans "security" and "liberty" to examine precisely what is to
be gained and what is to be relinquished. Who has this knowledge? Apart
from the epistemological question, upon whose moral consent are such
decisions premised? Who has the democratic and institutional legitimacy
20 On the part of consternation, see, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 11 (2010) ("My concern is with the preservation of our tradition of
republican values-most notably, the threat posed by the transformation of the White House into a
platform for charismatic extremism and bureaucratic lawlessness.") [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FALL OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC]; HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 7-8 (1990) ("The [Iran-contra] affair exposed a
serious and growing constitutional imbalance in our national processes of foreign affairs decision
making."); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY at x (1973) ("[U]nless the American
democracy figures out how to control the Presidency in war and peace without enfeebling the
Presidency across the board, then our system of government will face grave troubles."). On the part of
commendation, see, for example, ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 14-15 (2010) ("Our contrary thesis is that executive-centered
government in the administrative state is inevitable, and that law cannot hope to constrain the modern
executive."); JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11 13 (2005) ("[P]ractice has permitted the president to capture a large measure of
independent initiative in setting and carrying out American foreign policy .... "). On the influence of
emergencies, big and small, see, for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATrACK: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 6 (2006) ("If left to their own devices, presidents will predictably
exploit future terrorist attacks by calling on us to sacrifice more and more of our freedom if we ever
hope to win this 'war."'); Kim Lane Scheppele, Exceptions that Prove the Rule: Embedding Emergency
Government in Everyday Constitutional Life, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 124,
143 (Jeffrey K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010) ("The way to deal with actually existing
emergencies is to figure out how to live with them as a matter of normal constitutionalism.").
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to make these determinations?
If security is said to be the special province of executive expertise,
there is an absence of similar claims about liberty. When it comes to
decisions about the proper scope and substance of individual liberties,
constitutional practice reveals that citizens and courts, in addition to the
political branches, have a role to play.2' Whether it involves the
transformations "We the People" fashion,2 the interventions the people
themselves make,23 or the interpretations courts construct,24 the protection
of liberty is a shared enterprise. From the Constitution's Preamble, the
goal is not to provide security alone as a matter of "common defence," but
to "secure the Blessings of Liberty., 25 This goal is to be realized through a
divided structure of government suspicious of concentrated power.
Because of liberty's shared responsibility, there is a problem for the
unbound executive: if the relationship between liberty and security entails
tradeoffs, especially during perceived emergencies, and if liberty is a
matter for both citizens and courts, then security must be as well. Since
decisions about security necessarily entail decisions about liberty, for
citizens and courts to have a role in the one is for them to have a role in the
other. Alternately, we are left with the claim that given the relationship
between security and liberty and given the special expertise required in
deciding on security, citizens and courts should defer to executive
decisions about both security and liberty. In short, the tradeoff thesis
implies that whoever has authority to decide on liberty must also have
authority to decide on security. This correspondence creates a dilemma:
either citizens and courts have non-exclusive authority to decide on both,
or courts must grant executive officials expansive deference on matters of
liberty as well. This Article argues that the latter proposition is untenable
and, therefore, citizens and courts must have non-exclusive authority to
21 What the precise distribution of roles should be is another question, particularly when the
constitutional meaning of a protected liberty is at stake. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 (1980) (arguing courts should reinforce democratic
representation).
22 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 384 (1998) ("The key notion...
[is] unconventional adaption: at periods of peak mobilization, victorious movements use their control
over standing institutions to take actions that go well beyond normal legal authority.").23 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004) ("Both in its origins and for most of our history, American
constitutionalism assigned ordinary citizens a central and pivotal role in implementing their
Constitution.").
24 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) ("Security subsists, too, in fidelity to
freedom's first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the
personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 536 (2004) ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in
its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.").25 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
20121
make decisions about both national security and individual liberty.
This argument relies on the strength of the initial premise-liberty and
security are in some way inextricable. On the one hand, this premise needs
no further defense because those who advocate the necessity of tradeoffs
assume it to be true. On the other hand, the premise tells us nothing about
the complex ways liberty and security relate in political and constitutional
practice. Moreover, both liberty and security are themselves complex
concepts subject to multiple meanings. Yet whatever the more precise
connections between liberty and security, under the tradeoff thesis
decisions about the one will entail consequences for the other.26 Because
of this interconnectedness, whomever has the authority to decide on liberty
must also decide on security. This latter conclusion is one not recognized
by advocates of tradeoff, and has important implications for decision-
making processes. As Part II explains, neither American constitutional text
nor tradition recognizes any special presidential authority over questions of
liberty, even where both might assign authority to the president to decide
war and foreign affairs matters. Moreover, when it comes to making
judgments about the tradeoff between liberty and security, there is no
justification for special deference to executive officials. Rather, as Part III
explains, given the nature of the relation between security and liberty, and
given how institutional constraints work under the Constitution, citizens
and courts who have authority to decide matters of liberty also have
valuable input into matters of security. Apart from the special knowledge
citizens and courts might have about particular matters of liberty and the
roles they play in individual lives, an interest in allocating authority over
questions of liberty is in part justified by the harms of concentrated
decision-making a polity seeks to avoid. In a long American tradition
articulated well by the Declaration of Independence, these harms are
sometimes labeled "tyranny." Advocates of unbounded executive
authority seek to foreclose the need to distribute decision-making authority
by arguing that concern over tyranny is a phobia. Against this view, Part
IV argues that far from emotional responses to crises, American
constitutional culture disperses authority over both liberty and security as a
constitutive feature of constrained political practice.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS ON LIBERTY
Liberty plays such a central role in American constitutional theory and
practice that it becomes, at times, the very air in which more substantive
values breathe. From the foundational arguments urging ratification of the
Constitution, the view has been that "[t]he genius of republican liberty,
seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be derived
26 See infra Part III for a complete discussion of the tradeoff thesis.
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from the people; but that those entrusted with it should be kept in
dependence on the people ... .,27 Under the Madisonian framework, not
only does power ultimately reside in the people, but the separation of
powers "is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of
liberty. 28 Liberty could be threatened by factions using government to
advance their own selfish agendas or by corrupt officials wielding the
power of office in defiance of the common good. Madison's design
problem then is "not only to guard the society against the oppression of its
rules, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part., 29  Each of these governing problems could be solved through
constitutional design. By "giving to those who administer each department
the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others," Madison argued that the Constitution could
provide "security against a gradual concentration of the several powers."3°
Office holders were to identify with their offices, jealously guarding them
against encroachments from other departments. In this way, legislators
would be inclined to identify with the powers and virtues of their office
and contest aggrandizement of their power by executive officials. By
maintaining a federal structure and a divided national government, "a
double security arises to the rights of the people.' In turn, an enlarged
republic would "make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens. 32 In these
ways, structural design could turn mere "parchment barriers, 33 which by
themselves are "not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which
lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the
same hands... 34 into a means of securing constitutional rights.
These constitutional design features seek to disperse decision-making
authority across offices and actors in order to best preserve and promote
liberty. No thought was given to the proposition that liberty would be best
preserved in times of crisis through concentration of powers over liberty or
security in the executive department. In fact, quite the opposite is the case.
A theme repeated throughout The Federalist Papers is that the "security of
liberty" 35 is to be achieved through a constitutional design of separated
powers. Constituting government to provide "security for civil rights, 3
6
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 14, at 227 (James Madison).
28 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 14, at 321 (James Madison).
29 Id. at 323.
'0 Id. at 321.
31 Id. at 323.
32 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 14, at 83 (James Madison).
33 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 14, at 308 (James Madison).34 Id. at 313.
35 THE FEDERALIST No. 1, supra note 14, at 35-36 (Alexander Hamilton).
36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 14, at 324 (James Madison).
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suggests, along with the goal to "secure the Blessings of Liberty,"37 that
security and liberty are often mutually reinforcing goals subject to
dispersed authority. Responsibility for security is shared by Congress,
which has the power to declare war, raise, support, and make rules for
armies and a navy, and to call forth the militia to suppress insurrections or
invasions,38 and the President, who is the Commander in Chief with
foreign relations powers and duties to faithfully execute the laws.39 In
addition, some responsibility for security resides with "the People" who
comprise the militias.
Against Madison, some scholars argue that this structural design has
failed because it does not adequately constrain executive discretion in the
modem administrative state.4 ° Particularly in times of crisis, Congress,
courts, and citizens are prone to grant great deference to executive
decisions, providing oversight, if at all, with minimalist interventions.41
Whatever Madison may have intended, the complexity of modem
government means that Congress no longer has the ability to monitor the
executive's implementation of legislation.42 Add to this complexity the
institutional problems of collective action, asymmetry of knowledge, and
party identification, and Madisonian checks can seem optimistic at best.43
Moreover, the presumed incentive structure seems not to be borne out in
practice, as officials care less about the interests of their departments than
37 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
38 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11-15.
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
40 See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARv. L. REv. 657, 671 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment and Politics]
("Madison's theory of constitutional design was thus incomplete, and in some important respects
mistaken."); see also POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 17 ("Madisonian separation of powers is
obsolete."); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARv. L.
REv. 915, 952 (2005) ("Yet beyond the vague suggestion of a psychological identification between
official and institution, Madison failed to offer any mechanism by which this connection [between
office holder and office] would take hold."). But see PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: HOW
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 5 (2009) ("The new unilateral presidency is
thus not appealing either as constitutional interpretation or as good institutional design."); Josh Chafetz,
The Political Animal and the Ethics of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 9 (2011),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/124/januaryll/forum-648.php (arguing that a republican
conception of politics provides "an ethics of constitutional commitment").
41 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 76 ("In the context of
war, minimalists want above all to avoid large-scale interventions into democratic processes.").
42 See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1133
(2009) ("Black holes arise because legislators and executive officials will never agree to subject all
executive action to thick legal standards."). Congress has greater powers of oversight, but repeatedly
fails to use them. See Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 723 (2012)
(examining congressional powers that "have been systematically underused or misused in a way that
tends to diminish Congress's power vis-A-vis the other branches.").
43 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 25-29.
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about their own.44 Recognition of these failures have led to passage of
framework statutes meant to cabin executive power, as well as unrealized
proposals for further structural reform. 45  To the critics, the cycle-
expanding executive power, leading to new statutory checks, followed by
renewed expansion of executive power--demonstrates that the primary
check is political, not constitutional.
Whether these criticisms hit their mark or not, they do not establish
who decides on liberty. Even if Madisonian structural design has not
always succeeded in full, failure to provide adequate oversight of executive
administration does not mean that executive officials either do or should
make final decisions on matters of liberty. The American constitutional
tradition often expects such decisions to involve the judiciary, as the
Supreme Court made clear regarding the military detention and trial of
civilians in Exparte Milligan: "We all know that it was the intention of the
men who founded this Republic to put the life, liberty, and property of
every person in it under the protection of a regular and permanent
judiciary, separate, apart, distinct, from all other branches of the
government.''46 More broadly, the judiciary's role includes oversight of
fundamental liberties against legislative majorities when it comes to
matters of speech, 47 association, 48 privacy, 49 and marriage,50 among others.
Even during military actions under emergency conditions, executive
authority over the detention of individuals does not remain free from
judicial oversight, deferential as it might be at times.5' The Supreme Court
44 Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 40, at 729.
45 See, e.g., War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), (codified at
50 U.S.C. 1541-48 (2006)); National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976)
(codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92
Stat. 1101 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 466-98 (2006)); see also ACKERMAN, FALL OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, supra note 20, at 178 ("[W]e cannot sustain a rule-of-law presidency without fundamental
institutional reform.").
46 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 63 (1866).
47 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (limiting power of "a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation").
48 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (protecting "indispensable liberties,
whether of speech, press, or association" against government action).
49 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The petitioners are entitled to respect for
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding various
Bill of Rights "provisions that create zones of privacy").
5o See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State.").
51 Even deferential holdings during wartime required initial review of whether executive decisions
adequately safeguarded individual liberties, as the Court acknowledged in the Nazi saboteur cases. See
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942) ("In view of the public importance of the questions
raised .. . and of the duty which rests on the courts, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to
2012]
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retained habeas jurisdiction over "enemy combatant" detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay in Boumediene v. Bush,52 and concluded that the
president lacked unilateral powers to try terrorism suspects in military
commissions that did not comply with domestic and international legal
standards in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.53 Although the scope and meaning of
these judicial interventions are subject to interpretation, what remains clear
is that constitutional cases do not recognize an unchecked presidential
authority to decide matters of liberty, even during emergencies or wartime.
Perhaps during a prior military conflict, the Court's opinion in Korematsu
might represent a high water mark of presidential deference, coming
closest to upholding a nearly unchecked executive authority over the
liberty of persons.54 Yet, even here, the Court purports to apply "the most
rigid scrutiny" 55 in upholding the detention of persons of Japanese ancestry
on the basis of military necessity. Much, however, in the development of
domestic and international law has changed since the Court's decision in
Korematsu, providing a very different context for judicial oversight of
56 ti
executive detention practices. In this context, the Supreme Court
recognized that the executive might have an important security interest in
establishing detention policies, but that "history and common sense teach
us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a
means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of
threat.,57 Contested though they may be, and imperfectly implemented as
critics might allege, Madisonian structures continue to provide the
framework in which decisions about liberty and security are made. 5
Within Madisonian structures, institutional roles are not immutably
preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty, and because in our opinion the public
interest required that we consider and decide those questions without any avoidable delay.").
52 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) ("The Framers viewed freedom from unlawful
restraint as a fundamental precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital
instrument to secure that freedom.").
53 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
54 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
'5 Id. at 216.
56 Jack Goldsmith argues that courts, Congress, the press, and both military and non-military legal
culture have developed mechanisms to hold presidents accountable to such an extent that "we have
witnessed the rise and operation of purposeful forms of democratic (and judicial) control over the
Commander in Chief, and have indeed established strong legal and constitutional constraints on the
presidency." JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11, at xvi (2012). Moreover, the Supreme Court "did push back against the President ... ultimately
proving to be one of the most important agents for making the Constitution's checks and balances work
in the last decade." Id. at 166.
57 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004).
58 Regarding protected First Amendment liberties, the Supreme Court rejected the president's
national security arguments that sought to enjoin the New York Times from publishing a classified
study, stating that "[t]he word 'security' is a broad, vague generality whose contours should not be
invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment." New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971).
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fixed, but require continual renewal in light of experience and prevailing
constitutional understandings and practices. According to Cass Sunstein,
two contrasting positions might define the available options regarding who
decides on liberty and security, especially during emergencies: National
Security Maximalism and Liberty Maximalism.59 Each produces its own
pathologies. By focusing on national security, officials risk giving
"support [to] unjustified intrusions on civil liberties." 60 By focusing on
liberty, courts risk rendering insufficiently informed decisions that may
harm national security.6 ' In between these two extremes, Sunstein argues
that Congress should provide clear authorizations for deprivations of
fundamental liberties, and that courts should provide incompletely
theorized opinions while insisting that executive decisions to detain
individuals be subject to minimal due process review.62
At first blush, Sunstein's tertium quid recognizes no special executive
prerogative to decide matters of liberty.63 Courts and Congress each have
at least a minimal role to play in making decisions affecting liberty. On
closer inspection, a minimalist judicial role, especially in the context of the
problems identified by Madisonian critics, yields no recognition of the
special expertise courts have in articulating the meanings of rights and
liberties. 64 Under minimalism, the substance of judicial review is confined
to whether Congress has provided clear statements authorizing executive
action or to whether the outer limits of fundamental rights, such as free
speech, are protected.65 Under-theorized opinions can lead to theoretical
distortions as executive officials fill the public sphere with dramatic-and
hyperbolic--security claims.66 That is, national security maximalism
defines the executive's approach, while no institution stands as a
counterweight to advocate liberty maximalism. At best, academics and
civil libertarians are left to argue for liberty, as minimalist courts focus on
procedure and process.
59 Sunstein, supra note 41, at 108.
6°Id. at 109.
61 Id. at 108.
62 Id. at 109.
63 Id. at 53-54.
6 See Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 643, 647 (2008)
("[T]he Court sits not to resolve the dispute before it, which may leave the Court free to choose the
narrowest ground that would serve that purpose, but rather to nourish and protect the basic values of the
Constitution.").
65 Sunstein, supra note 41, at 109.
6 For example, Attorney General Ashcroft attracted much attention for the following:
"Emboldened by public opinion surveys showing that Americans overwhelmingly support the
administration's initiatives against terrorism, Mr. Ashcroft told the Senate Judiciary Committee, 'To
those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: your tactics
only aid terrorists."' Neil A. Lewis, A Nation Challenged: The Senate Hearing; Ashcroft Defends
Antiterror Plan; Says Criticism May Aid U.S. Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,2001, at Al.
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Because far more institutional heft supports security over liberty, what
Sunstein presents as two extremes on a continuum-national security
maximalism and liberty maximalism---turn out to occupy asymmetrical
positions. If the criticisms of Madison's structural design have any force,
then the institutional involvement of Congress does not entail a strong
check focused on the needs and meanings of liberty either. Thus, under
minimalism, the executive decides on liberty-its scope and meaning-
subject to deferential judicial review. This outcome is puzzling, since
there is no reason to expect executive officials to have the incentives or
knowledge to value liberty appropriately, and ample reasons to expect that
they will overvalue security. Despite the lack of reasons, and perhaps
more as a matter of inclination, advocates of the deference thesis claim that
civil libertarians overvalue liberty (or undervalue risks to security),
suggesting as a consequence that executive officials are better at valuing
liberty after all.
Background institutional practices of minimalism themselves provide
incentives for executive officials to overvalue security. Invoking threats to
national security triggers statutory powers, burnishes political power, and
raises barriers to criticism of presidential policy. Once the executive cites
emergency, then judicial review shifts towards minimalism, freeing
executive decisions from more searching inquiry. As a consequence of this
dynamic, rule of law critics contend that the resulting legal "grey holes"
grant "the fagade or form of the rule of law rather than any substantive
protections' 67 to unconstrained executive action. Defenders of unbounded
executive power respond by arguing that "[j]udges defer because they
think the executive has better information than they do, and because this
informational asymmetry or gap increases during emergencies.' 68 Even
while presidents prefer to govern through administration, relying on their
69
own powers and broad readings of congressional delegations, governing
through emergency provides still greater prospects for unchecked
70creativity. Minimalism contributes incentives for the president to govern
through emergencies, small and large, because emergencies require the
knowledge and expertise over which executive officials claim special
67 DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 3
(2006).
68 Vermeule, supra note 42, at 1135.
69 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2248 (2001)
("[P]residential control of administration ... expanded dramatically during the Clinton years, making
the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies more and more an extension of the President's
own policy and political agenda.").
70 As Vermeule emphasizes: "[e]mergencies ... put a premium on creativity and fresh solutions."
Vermeule, supra note 42, at 1145. By contrast, Ackerman argues that government by emergency
"legitimates the idea that the presidency may revolutionize the status quo in a matter of moments,
without the decade-long process of mobilized deliberation and decision required by the standard
operation of the separation of powers." ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 74.
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prerogative.7 Security facilitates, whereas liberty constrains, expansive
presidential power. In a choice between liberty and security, therefore, one
can expect presidential action will gravitate to its least inhibited position.
A presidential interest in governing within spheres of greatest
discretion has not gone unnoticed by courts. Such assertions of
presidential prerogative occur within a constitutional tradition suspicious
of unilateral action. In his separate concurrence in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
Justice Souter acknowledged the structural problem of deferring to
executive decisions about liberty:
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on
what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether
in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well
entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose
particular responsibility is to maintain security. For
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the
branch on which to rest the Nation's entire reliance in
striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in
liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security
will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately
raises.72
Such reasoning is also at home in other Supreme Court opinions limiting
the power of executive officials to employ claims of emergency and
71 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 836 (2006) ("[T]he
normal' American constitutional order can be seen as thoroughly shot through with emergency law
and . . . this constant sense of emergency has fundamentally shaped the possibilities of American
constitutionalism."). Because of the dynamic in which emergencies beget emergency powers (and vice
versa), Americans face the prospect of a repetitive cycle in the face of future terrorist attacks:
After each successful attack, politicians will come up with a new raft of
repressive laws that ease our anxiety by promising greater security-only to find
that a different terrorist band manages to strike a few years later. This new
disaster, in turn, will create a demand for more repression, and on and on....
[T]he pathological political cycle will prove devastating to civil liberties by
2050.
ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 2. In contrast, Posner and Vermeule raise the specter of a ratchet that
turns the opposite way: civil libertarians will demand more protections for civil liberties with every
liberty-based gain, threatening to harm security. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 45. Given the
unidirectional movement of the security-liberty tradeoff, Ackerman's cautionary prospect is far more
plausible and concerning.
72 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring).
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necessity to justify unchecked action.73 Justice Jackson concurred in the
Court's decision to deny President Truman the power to seize the domestic
steel industry, warning that emergencies create "a ready pretext for
usurpation," and "that emergency powers would tend to kindle
emergencies.
74
Skepticism about the executive's unilateral expertise on matters
impacting liberties can be bolstered by attention to the cognitive limitations
that attend group polarization or the constant availability of large and small
security threats.75 Charged with keeping America safe, executive officials
may find no security risk too small to pursue, despite the costs to liberty.76
President Obama, for example, claims that his responsibility for the
nation's security is "the first thing that I think about when I wake up in the
morning. It's the last thing that I think about when I go to sleep at night.1
77
The more a President listens only to those charged with similar
responsibilities, the greater the risk that the group of decision-makers
collectively will produce more polarized threat assessments and less
constrained policies to address them. 78 These dynamics-a temptation to
73 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (plurality
opinion) ('The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or
from the Constitution itself.").74 1d. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring). This reasoning also reflects Hamilton's argument in
Federalist No. 8, where he wrote:
Safety from external danger, is the most powerful director of national conduct.
Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The
violent destruction of life and property incident to war; the continual effort and
alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most
attached to liberty, to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a
tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at
length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
THE FEDERALIST No. 8, supra note 14, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton).
75 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 62-63, 98-
99, 204-05 (2005) (defining group polarization, and explaining the need to counteract the "various
cognitive limitations that people face in thinking about risks" because "public fear might produce
unjustified intrusions on civil liberties"). See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC, AND AMOS
TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982).
76 See RON SUSKIND, ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PURSUIT OF ITS
ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 18 (2006) (quoting Vice President Cheney as stating that "it's going to be vital
for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective.").
77 Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Archives and Records Administration, I PUB. PAPERS
689, 690 (May 21, 2009); see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 56, at 25-29 (discussing ways that
information, responsibility, national security culture, and executive-branch perspectives all contribute
to forming the President's views on national security matters).
78 For present purposes, the possibility of cognitive bias provides reasons to doubt that expertise
over security implies unchecked expertise over liberty. To avoid errors caused by polarization or other
rational biases, one strategy is to involve more voices and perspectives-the Madisonian solution. See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 145 (2003) ("[T]he American founders' largest
contribution consisted in their design of a system that would ensure a place for diverse views in
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over-inflate security risks, a focus on institutional duties to provide
security, and the possibility of cognitive bias-are reasons to think that the
executive does not have any particular expertise to decide on liberty.
Skepticism, combined with the existence of constitutional constraints,
provides reasons to look elsewhere for expertise on questions of liberty.
Asserting dispersed authority to decide on liberty, Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion in Hamdi claimed that "[w]hatever power the United
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other
nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake., 79 Because decisions about security are often also about liberty, the
Court reserves a role in checking the President's claims to decide on
questions of individual liberty by deciding on matters of national
80
security.
Despite these robust claims to limit executive discretion, emergency
powers affecting fundamental liberties have also met with deferential
Supreme Court decisions. Who decides matters of liberty is sometimes a
story of shifting, albeit shared, responsibilities. The Court upheld
exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast in
Korematsu v. United States,81 and upheld curfews imposed on civilians by
a military commander in Hirabayashi v. United States.82 Even in Hamdi,
the Court held that the President could detain individuals as unlawful
enemy combatants subject only to minimal due process review,83 and in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld84 it implied that military tribunals authorized by
Congress would satisfy due process standards. These cases are consistent
with minimalist rulings, leaving questions of liberty largely to the
executive to determine while the Court remains "wary and humble
85
concerning its own limited expertise in matters affecting national security.
In a case considering the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited
persons from providing material support to foreign entities designated by
the State Department as terrorist organizations, as applied to persons who
proffer lawful and nonviolent forms of aid, the Court adopted a position of
deference to executive expertise. The Court reasoned that "when it comes
government."); cf. POSNER & VERMEUELE, supra note 3, at 68 ("The availability heuristic and similar
cognitive mechanisms provide a flimsy basis for departing from the deferential view.").
79 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion).
'0 About the importance of adhering to constitutional process, even if inconvenient, the Court
instructs: "With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet
found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully
crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
"t 323 U.S. 214,223-24 (1944).
82 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943).
83 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537.
8 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006).
85 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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to collecting evidence and drawing factual inferences in this area, the lack
of competence on the part of the courts is marked, and respect for the
Government's conclusions is appropriate." 86  Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Youngstown provides a defense of such narrow and
deferential decisions, admonishing that "[r]igorous adherence to the
narrow scope of the judicial function is especially demanded in
controversies that arouse appeals to the Constitution," 87 because of the
limited expertise judges have about questions of security.
Deference to the safety and security decisions of executive officials are
not limited to national security contexts, but exist in reviewing ordinary
policing and correctional practices. Considering whether the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonable suspicion to strip search persons detained
for minor violations, the Court concluded that "[m]aintaining safety and
order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials,
who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the
problems they face."88  Expertise in law enforcement practices yields
judicial deference on matters of what constitutes reasonable suspicion in
the totality of the circumstances, s9 or whether exigent circumstances justify
police fears that destruction of evidence is imminent.90 If we take the view
espoused by Justice Frankfurter as the model for flexible deference to
executive officials' claims to expertise in matters of safety and security,
then constitutional criminal procedure reveals that the dynamic question of
who decides between liberty and security is not one confined to the
dramatic setting of the "War on Terror." Political dynamics that have
created the administrative rule by experts, as Rana traces, 91 have created
pressures on courts to focus on political process as a means of deciding
questions of liberty.92
86 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
87 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
88 Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 10-945, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2012).
89 See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (holding that a border patrol agent had
reasonable suspicion based on the totality of his observations to stop and search the plaintiffs' vehicle).
90 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853-54 (2011) ("It is well established that 'exigent
circumstances,' including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to
conduct an otherwise permissible search without first obtaining a warrant.").
9' See Rana, supra note 4, at 52 (examining Justice Frankfurter's deference in national security
cases).
92 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN LAW 1, 4 (2004) (describing the conflict between the executive unilateralists and the civil
libertarian idealists who advocate for differing expertise when confronted with security threats). As
scholars have argued, these dynamics also lead the Supreme Court to focus on procedure over
substance, especially regarding executive detention policies. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Talk Loudly and
Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491, 494
(2010) (arguing that rather than risk institutional capital by issuing substantive rulings, "[tihe Court,
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Deferential judicial decisions by themselves tell an incomplete story.
Deference is only possible in the context of judicial review of executive
decisions, requiring officials to justify their practices to skeptical judges
and publics. As cases such as Rasu13 and Hamdan94 attest, a president
may advance views the Supreme Court rejects, especially regarding the
locus of authority to decide fundamental matters of individual liberty.
President Bush asserted authority to hold individuals at Guantanamo Bay
free from judicial oversight and unencumbered by the obligations imposed
by the Geneva Conventions. By claiming expertise over security, the
President also claimed to be the sole authority over the liberty of those he
designated as "enemy combatants." Even minimalist constitutional
decisions rejected the President's claim to unchecked authority over
matters of liberty. Because the Supreme Court is the institution with
traditional constitutional authority over questions of liberty, minimalism
provides no justifications for executive authority over liberty, though its
effects may at times over-value the institutional decisions executive
officials make.
When we examine our constitutional tradition, we find assurances that
the Constitution protects liberty through all three branches of government
existing in an uncertain relation of deference to executive decisions
regarding security. Likewise, every scholarly thrust made on behalf of
concerns for civil liberties can be parried on behalf of greater deference to
the security decisions of executive officials. 95 Unlike the imagery of thrust
and parry, which suggests equality of strength and position, the practice of
deferring to executive expertise on matters of security is a way of deciding
on liberty. Executive officials decide on liberty by deciding security. This
instead, took limited risks to protect its turf and assert its power to 'say what the law is."'); Joseph
Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 440 (2011) ("[T]here
appears to be an emerging dominance of proceduralist approaches, which take as a given that rights
dissolve under political pressure, and, thus, are best protected by basic procedural measures."); Jenny S.
Martinez, Process and Substance in the "War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (suggesting
"there is a pattern of focus-on-procedure-while-sidestepping-substance that is odd enough to require
explanation"); Stephen 1. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, It1 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122,
134 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/l1l1/122 Vladeck.pdf ("[T]he
Supreme Court has had remarkably little to say about the underlying legality of virtually all of the
government's post-September 11 counterterrorism initiatives.").
93 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
94 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
95 The "thrust and parry" imagery is from Karl Llewellyn's account of canons of statutory
interpretation. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). Insofar as there
are competing paradigms to evaluate how to decide on the proper tradeoff-a war model or a law
enforcement model-the give and take may produce convergences. See Robert Chesney & Jack
Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1079, 1081 (2008) (discussing convergence of military detention practices and criminal law
processes).
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method is on display in criminal procedure decisions that decide on the
liberty and privacy protected under the Fourth Amendment by examining
the need of law enforcement officials and the expertise they possess,
sometimes without even articulating the liberty interests at stake.96 Here is
the puzzle. Given security's fraught relation to liberty, why would
expertise of the kind that requires knowledge of threats and the technology
of solutions also produce expertise on matters of the constitutional
constraints that exist on those solutions? Expertise in one area does not
make one expert in another. 97
In light of this ambivalence about expertise, there are two possible
responses. First, one might claim that we really have given the president
authority over liberty, checked only by ordinary politics. In this case,
judicial rhetoric and academic scholarship to the contrary have failed to
acknowledge actual political practice and institutional development. A
second response is that the president does not have special authority over
liberty, because constitutional constraints-from the writ of habeas corpus,
to structural and internal checks, to the role of courts in protecting
liberty-as well as legally informed politics disperse that authority. On
this account, neither principle nor practice provides executive officials with
explicit authority to decide matters of individual liberty. For either
possibility, the extent of executive authority over liberty must be found in
the principles and practices governing the tradeoff between liberty and
security.
III. TRADEOFFS
The tradeoff thesis asserts the inevitable existence of conditions under
which it will be impossible for policymakers to improve security without
curtailing liberty. Taken by itself, it purports to describe a feature of the
world devoid of normative evaluation. It just so happens that liberty and
security relate in this way. But tradeoffs are not mechanical exercises, nor
are the values at stake always fungible. Tradeoffs require allocative
choices implicating institutional actors and normative principles that
complicate their seeming simplicity.
The tradeoff thesis trades on an equivocation. At first glance, the
tradeoff thesis says that if our allocations are already operating at a Pareto
frontier with regard to any two suitably related goods (security and liberty,
for example), to have more of the one means necessarily having less of the
96 Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303, 312-13
(2010).
9' Such was the lesson of Plato's Apology: Athenians who were skilled at one craft, thought
themselves expert on other fundamental matters as well. PLATO'S APOLOGY, in PLATO COMPLETE
WORKS 22 (John M. Cooper ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., 1997) ("[Elach of them, because of his success
at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits.").
[Vol. 44:1511
WHO DECIDES ON LIBERTY?
other. To operate at a Pareto frontier means that any gain in one good must
entail a loss in the other.98 For example, if we have already done as much
on behalf of both security and liberty at airports, such that there is nothing
more we can do to improve security without further impacting liberties,
then there will have to be a tradeoff. But notice that under the assumption
that we are not operating below the frontier, such that improvements in
both liberty and security are possible, the kinds of liberties that might be
traded are of the everyday sort. Our freedom to travel with imprecise
identification is curtailed by the requirement that the name on our flight
reservation match the name on our government identification. Such a
policy is said to improve security while costing us some of our liberty. But
the myriad ways that freedom of movement in an airport, or on a public
street, might be impacted by government policy designed to improve
everyone's security are not the kinds of issues that are of primary concern
to civil libertarians. 99 Rather, the tradeoff thesis becomes problematic
when it assumes that fundamental liberties are no different than the
quotidian. Under conditions of scarcity, trading security for liberty may be
no different than trading guns for butter. Policy decisions have allocative
effects not only on the matter at hand-provision of specific security
policies-but on other matters affected-like specific liberties. By
contrast, trading the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures or
the rights to free speech for purported gains in security raises different
issues.'00  The specific constitutional protections afforded such rights
means that they have a special status within our politics. They exceed the
normal tradeoffs.
Judicial review of government policies that impact rights and liberties
exemplify this distinction. If government establishes policies that touch on
non-fundamental liberties, the Supreme Court reviews government actions
under a rational basis standard, asking only whether the policy bears some
rational relation to a legitimate government interest. 10' By contrast, if
98 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 26 (The Pareto frontier "identifies a range of points at
which no win-win improvements are possible: any change in policies that makes A better off must
make B worse off.").
99 Jeremy Waldron makes a related point about the fact that "liberty could be a matter of more or
less." WALDRON, supra note 1, at 30.
100 Although the distribution of burdens under a tradeoff can produce inequalities--often the lost
liberties are those of others, as David Cole suggests-the equivocation occurs in treating all liberties
alike. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 21 (2003) ("[T]he government has repeatedly targeted noncitizens,
selectively denying them liberties that citizens rightfully insist upon for themselves."). To borrow from
John Rawls' critique of utilitarian distributions of goods that do not respect "the distinction between
persons," the tradeoff thesis does not respect the distinction among liberties. See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 24 (rev. ed. 1999).
101 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("[T]he law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
20121
government policy affects fundamental rights, then the Court reviews the
government action under strict scrutiny, asking whether government has
pursued a compelling interest through narrowly tailored means.10 2  On
closer inspection, the tradeoff thesis applies not only to the banal tradeoffs
of everyday policy, but also to the contentious derogations of fundamental
rights such as the right to free speech or the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. By ignoring relevant differences, the
tradeoff thesis trades on losses in liberty to increase security in the
quotidian case to justify the more fundamental.10 3 Under this equivocation,
"[c]onstitutional rules do no good, and some harm, if they block
government's attempts to adjust the balance as threats wax and wane. ' 1°4
On this argument, the tradeoff thesis applies equally to the everyday and
the constitutionally significant case.
Tradeoffs are inevitable only when goods and values are available for
trade. Availability depends on the background values and priorities to
which a constitutional polity commits itself. Constitutional values are not
absolute, and are subject over time to changing circumstances and
choices. 0 5 But at any given moment, particular values and principles will
be central to a constitutional culture's self-understanding, and therefore not
amenable to trade. 10 6  For example, under present constitutional
understandings, a free and independent press is a good unavailable for
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure
was a rational way to correct it."); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
("[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless.., it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.").
1'2 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("[]f [racial classifications] are ever to be
upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective,
independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to
eliminate."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("Where
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty .... [t]he law must be shown necessary, and
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
103 Stephen Holmes notes that the selective focus on liberty has an additional partisan political
valence, as "[a]dvocates of unconstrained executive discretion ... selectively emphasize some forms of
liberty while neglecting others, effectively advocating a sharp reduction of the liberties prized by their
liberal opponents, while passing over in silence the liberties dear to conservatives." Stephen Holmes,
In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 301, 314
(2009).
104 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 31.
105 See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 62 (2011) (discussing constitutional dynamics when "the content and features of the
constitutional system are constantly changing.").
106 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2006) ("[C]onstitutional
culture supplies understandings of role and practices of argument through which citizens and officials
can propose new ways of enacting the society's defining commitments-as well as resources to resist
those proposals.").
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trade, even if it were true that a less-informed public could be made more
secure through censorship. The point of protecting particular rights and
liberties under a constitution is to make them unavailable to ordinary
tradeoffs. Focusing official claims that tradeoffs of fundamental liberties
are necessary through an analysis of compelling interests and narrow
tailoring, as Supreme Court doctrine requires, is a way of incorporating
constitutional values into the allocative decision-making of governing
officials. A tradeoff of a fundamental liberty like the freedom of the press
would mean something very different to a constitutional culture than would
a tradeoff of an everyday good such as uninhibited movement through
airports. This difference makes some tradeoffs that might otherwise
appear hypothetically possible according to the tradeoff thesis, practically
and constitutionally unavailable. Equivocation regarding this distinction
occurs by ignoring the distinctive role that constitutional principles and
practice play in the political lives of both citizens and officials.
Combining the tradeoff thesis with the deference thesis, Posner and
Vermeule argue that "[w]hen judges or academic commentators say that
government has wrongly assessed the net benefits or costs of some security
policy or other, they are amateurs playing at security policy, and there is no
reason to expect that courts can improve upon government's emergency
policies in any systematic way.' 0 7 On the Pareto frontier, executive policy
makers can decide on the best allocation of liberty and security since the
two goods are said to relate directly, but judges and academics are
amateurs at security policy. Are they also amateurs regarding liberties?
As we have seen, there is no tradition of claiming that executive officials
have special expertise to decide the proper scope and distribution of
individual rights and liberties, nor any indication that citizens and courts
are unqualified to determine matters of liberty.
Perhaps the claim is somewhat different: when security is at stake,
executive officials have special expertise to decide on both security and
liberty because of the particular way these two values trade off.0 8 To
decide on the proper allocation of security is to decide on the appropriate
protections for liberty. If this is the claim, two problems arise. First,
several unarticulated questions about the tradeoff need to be asked: how
are security and liberty more specifically supposed to relate; what kinds of
security gains are to be balanced against which liberties; and what
epistemic standards govern these decisions?'0 9 If to decide on security is
107 id.
1" See SHUE, supra note 12, at 70 ("A mutual dependence holds between enjoyment of fights to
some liberties and enjoyment of security and subsistence and, in the other direction, between
enjoyment of rights to security and subsistence and enjoyment of some liberties.").
109 See Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, With Apologies, 86 TEx. L. REV. 569, 581-85 (2008)
(considering the imprecise ways the rhetoric of balance operates).
20121
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW
also to decide on liberty, then executive officials will be expected to
provide public justifications that articulate answers to these questions.1" ° It
is not enough simply to describe past situations when courts have deferred
to presidential decisions or to assert that citizens and courts ought to defer
to those decisions. Presidential powers may be ambiguously constrained
and may have discretionary institutional advantages, but they must still
operate within democratic processes dependent on public justifications for
deprivations to everyday liberty.11' As in the case of ordinary tradeoffs,
such justifications require articulating public necessity in light of the
effects on specific liberties. Because justifications are subject to judicial
and public evaluation, both law and politics will constrain the available
means by which Presidents pursue specific security protections. Security
decisions affecting liberty must be justified according to the appropriate
epistemic standards-reasonableness in everyday matters and narrowly
tailored compelling interests regarding fundamental rights. Unreasonable
procedures are likely to meet with public disapprobation and non-
compelling interests will fail judicial review. Public expectations about the
protections afforded constitutional rights will in turn inform the political
constraints operating on executive discretion 2  In this way, legal and
political constraints are mutually reinforcing. In short, if the tradeoff thesis
claims that Presidents decide questions of liberty by deciding questions of
security, it fails to establish any basis for special deference to the President
or any deficiency in public or judicial expertise, given the expectations of
public justification.
But if Presidents decide matters of liberty by default when they
'Io See generally RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION 2 (Jeffrey Flynn trans., 2012)
(exploring a basic right to justification that "expresses the demand that there be no political or social
relations of governance that cannot be adequately justified to those affected by them.").
1 Posner and Vermeule urge that the "unbound executive" is constrained by politics, requiring
mechanisms of justification and review. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 113. Though
one effective source of justification in politics is law itself, as Professor Pildes argues: "[J]udgments of
legality and political resistance to the President are so intertwined here as to make it meaningless to
purport to distinguish them." Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARv. L. REv. 1381,
1401 (2012).
112 One example is public disapproval of the PATRIOT Act's provision allowing Federal Bureau
of Investigation personnel to apply for an order that required the production of "any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)" in the course of an international
terrorism investigation. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62 (2006)). Library records became the most fiercely contested
"tangible things," as librarians led the public in demanding the legislation be revised. See, e.g., Anne
Klinefelter, The Role of Librarians in Challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act, 5 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 219
(2004); Judith Krug, Letter to the Editor, FBI 'Fishing Expeditions' Librarians' Biggest Worry, WALL
ST. J., May 24, 2004, at Al 5. In response to the furor, Congress provided heightened requirements for
officials to gain access to library records and patron lists. USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 106(b), 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006) (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1861(a)(3)).
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establish security policy, there need be no explicit institutional
acknowledgment of their authority over liberty. If they have authority,
they have it by default. On this view, executive officials need do no more
than establish their expertise regarding security to have authority over
liberty. This authority therefore need not be visible, wrapped always in the
appearance of security policy. Yet even in this case, Presidential decision-
making regarding security is constrained by the ways it must consider
constitutional and other legal norms protecting liberty. To keep the
decisions regarding liberty hidden, they must not have readily perceived
effects. One way of achieving this goal is to minimize the effects on
liberty, thereby preserving liberty while pursuing security. The other way
requires secrecy. For example, the Bush administration engaged in secret
warrantless surveillance of electronic communications of U.S. citizens,
impacting protected liberties through unobserved means." 3 Because of the
program's effects on liberty, secrecy became impossible to sustain.
Attempts to justify the program as necessary for maintaining security failed
to win widespread legal support, leading to both internal and external
constraints. Internal, because some officials argued the program was
illegal.' 14 External, because Congress provided a revised legal framework
to guide executive practice."' Either way, consideration of liberty was
inseparable from considerations of security. Yet, supposed expertise
regarding security does not lead to deference regarding liberty. Executive
officials seek either compliance or secrecy because there is likely to be
little institutional or political deference to executive decisions regarding
113 The secret National Security Agency program of warrantless electronic surveillance was first
revealed to the public by the New York Times. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy
on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; see generally ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S
LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008) (providing the full story of the surveillance
program). The Department of Justice defended the legality of the Bush Administration's practices,
citing inherent presidential powers to protect national security. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE
PRESIDENT 7 (Jan. 19, 2006) ("[b]ecause of the structural advantages of the Executive Branch, the
Founders also intended that the President would have the primary responsibility and necessary
authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to protect the Nation and to conduct the
Nation's foreign affairs.").
114 There was internal dissension in the administration over the legality of the NSA surveillance
program, leading the administration to take steps to bring the program in line with existing law. See
David Johnston & Scott Shane, Notes Detail Pressure on Ashcroft over Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2007, at Al 4; Scott Shane & David Johnston, Mining of Data Prompted Fight over U.S. Spying, N.Y.
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at Al; see also JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 181 (2007) ("After 9/I1 [David Addington and Vice
President Cheney] and other top officials in the administration dealt with FISA the way they dealt with
other laws they didn't like: they blew through them in secret based on flimsy legal opinions that they
guarded closely so no one could question the legal basis for the operations."); LICHTBLAU, supra note
113, at 176-85.
115 See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008); see also Eric
Lichtblau, Congress Strikes Deal to Overhaul Wiretap Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A].
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liberty.1 16  In this manner, the mutual dependence of liberty and security
can be just as constraining on Presidents as it can be potentially liberating.
Second, constitutional liberties often constrain executive action
regarding all kinds of circumstantial exigencies without further claims that
executive officials should be granted deference in determining when
constitutional constraints apply. For example, although police may face
exigent circumstances when investigating crime, courts decide when
exigencies permit deviation from background constitutional
requirements. 17 What is more, the Court, asserting its power to protect
liberties against executive claims of exigency, rejected President Truman's
claim that seizing steel mills was necessary under emergency
circumstances.' 18 Even in the "War on Terror," the Court has pushed back
against the idea that deference grants the President a "blank check" when it
comes to individual rights and liberties." 9 Perhaps such confrontations
between courts and presidents are relatively rare, and tend to occur after
the initial emergency subsides. 120  Their dearth could be a consequence of
judicial avoidance or because presidents internalize basic constitutional
constraints and values in their own decision-making.' 2' Office of Legal
Counsel ("OLC") opinions, which are binding on executive officials, are
116 To the extent that a President succeeds in keeping deep secrets, then neither law nor politics
can check government policy. In this case, however, the problem of secrecy takes on an entirely
different pallor having little to do with deference under tradeoffs. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and
Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REv. 489, 522 (2007) ("Because
[secrecy] is a tool that poses unique dangers of being used tyrannically and of being undiscoverable
when so used, strenuous efforts must be made to keep the tool within the sight of its ultimate owners,
the people."); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 323 (2010) (arguing that "deep
state secrecy ought to be avoided whenever feasible."). Transparency can also be difficult to achieve,
particularly as the goal of openness can hide as much as it reveals. See Mark Fenster, Seeing the State:
Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 622 (2010) ("The state's large, organizationally
and physically dispersed public bureaucracies perform a variety of functions and make a staggering
number of decisions of varying importance, not all of which can be viewed before the fact or even
easily reviewed later.").
117 See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (recognizing exigent circumstances
exception to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94
(1978) (discussing the "strictly circumscribed" situations in which exigency will justify a constitutional
violation).
118 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (plurality opinion)
(affirming the lower court's finding that the seizure of steel mills was not justified as an emergency
situation).
119 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) ("We have long since made clear that a
state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's
citizens.").
120 See, e.g., Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944) ("We are of the view that Mitsuye Endo
should be given her liberty.... For we conclude that, whatever power the War Relocation Authority
may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no authority to subject citizens who are concededly
loyal to its leave procedure.").
121 See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008).
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one way that executive practice can internalize constitutional norms.
1 22
Another way that presidents are constrained is in the very constitutional
nature of the office-its Article II assignment of powers, executive branch
traditions and precedents, established institutional practices, the
expectations of other institutions, public opinion and political participation,
in addition to legal commitments as a matter of internal perspectives on the
responsibilities of office. 123  But in either case, there is no institutional,
political, or legal admission that the President has special authority to
decide matters of liberty--even in the process of making decisions about
security. 124  Presidential authority over liberty is constrained by other
institutional actors, internalized legal norms, and public expectations.
Posner and Vermeule provide another version of the argument on
behalf of presidential authority over liberty. They insist that law provides
no constraint on executive decisions regarding tradeoffs. Practical political
considerations, not legal constraints, determine the nature of tradeoffs. If
this is true, then there is nothing about law or the Constitution that
constrains presidential decisions on how or when to trade liberty for
security.
If this is the final refuge for the unbound executive, it provides no
shelter. For starters, the very responsibility for security is itself a
construction of law-from the assignment of commander-in-chief powers
to the President, to the duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed," to congressional assignment of emergency powers and
122 Although OLC memos are not always checks on Presidential action, serving at times to
facilitate as much to constrain. The "torture memos" are the most notorious in this regard. See, e.g.,
MEMORANDUM FROM JAY S. BYBEE, HEAD OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,
TO ALBERTO R. GONZALES, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
INTERROGATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 31 (Aug. 1, 2002); see also, Dawn E. Johnsen,
Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1559, 1583 (2007) ("The Torture Opinion relentlessly seeks to circumvent all legal limits on the CIA's
ability to engage in torture, and it simply ignores arguments to the contrary."). Nonetheless, OLC can
provide normalizing standards for executive-branch legal advice. See Walter E. Dellinger et al.,
Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel, 81 IND. L.J. 1348, 1349 (2004) ("It is incumbent upon
the Attorney General and the President to ensure that OLC's advice is sought on important and close
legal questions and that the advice given reflects the best executive branch traditions.").
123 See Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 1551, 1555 (2011) ("No matter the emergency, a president will not vote on legislation, a court
will not issue executive orders, and Congress will not represent the nation in international affairs.");
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 979 (2009) ("To be a
president or a member of Congress or a justice of the Supreme Court is to serve in an institution that is
constituted and empowered by the Constitution and, as a result, necessarily constrained by it.").
124 Nor do presidents always assert special prerogative to value security over liberty through
tradeoffs. President Barack Obama declared in his 2009 inaugural address, for example: "As for our
common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals." Barack Obama,
Inaugural Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1,2 (Jan. 20, 2009).
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authorizations.' 25  Beyond these assignments, constitutional liberties
circulate in both politics and in judicial decisions, each establishing legal
limits td and expectations about presidential authority over both liberty and
security: To the extent that the executive branch fails to acknowledge legal
constraints constitutive of its very powers and responsibilities, it becomes
more of a deviant institution than the judiciary ever could be.1 26 Legally
unconstrained decisionism no more fits American constitutionalism than
unlimited powers of judicial review would. 127 The idea that law fails to
constrain presidential authority over liberty in practice---even if legal texts,
coordinate institutions, and public expectations all suggest otherwise, at
least in theory-provides no basis for thinking that the President does or
should receive deference in matters affecting fundamental liberties.
Using Posner and Vermeule's terminology, are executive officials then
"amateurs" playing at constitutional decision-making regarding liberty?128
Such overstatement is no more warranted here than with regard to judicial
review of decisions affecting security. Even if there has been a near
unbroken trend of increased executive expert authority over questions of
security, there has been no similar change in the institutional balance of
who decides on matters of fundamental liberty. The tradeoff thesis, as
presented by advocates of presidential deference, fails to account for the
bi-directional relation of security and liberty with different institutional
capacities and responsibilities over each.
The problem may be that the question of who decides on security fails
because of its own success. Taken in isolation, as a question about specific
policies regarding resource allocation, intelligence gathering, military
deployments, or diplomatic relations, security can be seen as requiring
special expertise of executive officials. 29 But as soon as security decisions
become inextricably tied to decisions affecting fundamental liberties
125 See Pildes, supra note 11, at 1410 ("'Politics' takes place within a widely accepted structure
of legal rules that constitute the political process and the roles and powers of public officials who
engage in that process.").
126 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 18 (1967) ("[J]udicial review is a deviant institution in American democracy.").
127The contrary view-that liberal legalism cannot escape decisionism-belongs to CARL
SCHMIT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George
Schwab trans., 1985) (1922) ("Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."), and has been more
recently advocated by Vermeule, supra note 42, at 1098-1101. Against decisionism, see NOMI CLAIRE
LAZAR, STATES OF EMERGENCY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 5 (2009) ("There is no exception; rights do
not lose their force, and the values underlying the rule of law do not lose their power.").
128 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at 3 1.
12 9 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this vast
external realm [of foreign affairs], with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."); see also Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 2047, 2086 (2005) ("[T]he President has significant concurrent constitutional authority in the
foreign affairs (and especially the war powers) field.").
[Vol. 44:1511
WHO DECIDES ON LIBERTY?
through tradeoffs, the complex relation between security and liberty
undermines executive claims to expertise and deference. If to decide on
security is to decide on liberty, then expertise on liberty must entail
authority to decide questions of security. In this way, the tradeoff runs in
both directions, as does the authority to decide matters of liberty and
security.
IV. THE FALLACY OF "PHOBIA" IN DECIDING MATTERS OF LIBERTY AND
SECURITY
Why does the question of who decides on matters of liberty and
security matter? What is the state of affairs which American legal
institutions are thought to foreclose by purporting to limit the decisional
authority of executive officials over liberty? Because of the close
relationship between security and liberty, is it plausible to think that no
sufficient deprivation of liberty occurs through presidential decisions on
matters of security to warrant a strong check on executive authority over
both liberty and security? Even absent a tradition recognizing executive
authority over questions of liberty, Posner and Vermeuele argue that
concern over legally unchecked executive power either "produces no
benefits . . . or it produces minimal benefits and substantial costs."' 3°
Since the founding, American constitutional culture has viewed the threat
of tyranny to require institutional and political vigilance. From the
Declaration of Independence's "history of repeated injuries and
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute
Tyranny over these States,'' to Franklin Roosevelt's 1944 State of the
Union address's concern that "[p]eople who are hungry and out of a job are
the stuff of which dictatorships are made,"' 132 Americans have adapted
institutional design and political practice to address the threat of legally
unconstrained executive authority.
Viewing the effectiveness of this strain of American constitutional
culture with skepticism, Posner and Vermeule argue that Americans suffer
from "tyrannophobia"--"the fear of dictatorship" 133-when they distrust
executive officials to decide matters of liberty free from legal constraints.
They articulate their position this way: "We suggest that liberal legalists
overlook the importance of de facto constraints arising from politics, and
thus equate a legally unconstrained executive with one that is
unconstrained tout court. The horror of dictatorship that results from this
fallacy and that animates liberal legalism is what we call
"' POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 204.
'3' THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
132 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message on the State of the Union, 13 PUB. PAPERS 32, 41 (Jan. 11,
1944).
133 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 177.
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'tyrannophobia." ' 134  One consequence of Posner and Vermeule's
argument is that the question of who decides on liberty is preempted by the
claim of tyrannophobia. Civil libertarian concerns are ruled out ex ante as
mere "phobias" said to accomplish nothing good, and that may in fact
wreak some harm on the polity. The other consequence is that, similar to
the asymmetry that exists in Sunstein's dichotomy between national
security maximalism and liberty maximalism, 3 5 rational public discourse
is free to fear insufficient provision for security, but irrational to fear
illegitimate deprivations of liberty.
To illustrate this asymmetry, imagine a people ambivalent about
executive power having emerged from a recent history of tyrannical rule.1
36
Within the context of a state's duty to provide security, suppose the
governing policy were to provide that if there is a one percent chance of
tyranny, given the catastrophic consequences for people's political lives
and liberties, it must be treated as a near certainty and responded to
accordingly with institutional checks and balances governed by law.
Could we make sense of such a policy? Would this be tyrannophobia?
Would it be illegitimate or unjustified? By contrast, now recall the actual
policy of the Bush administration. As described by Ron Suskind, the
policy pursued by Vice President Dick Cheney provided that "[e]ven if
there's just a one percent chance of the unimaginable coming due, act as if
it is a certainty."' 137 Ensuing policies treated the unimaginable terrorist
attack as certainty and bent policy and law around the expert capacities of
executive agents. Were such policies the products of irrational phobias?
Whatever one's answer to this question, it is clear that Posner and
Vermeule's argument is meant to defend the asymmetry between the
phobias of physical insecurity, which are rational matters for executive
expertise, and the phobias of political insecurity, which are pathologies to
be avoided. But why is it any more rational to adopt policies that might
deprive persons of fundamental liberties in pursuit of a one percent chance
of insecurity, than it is to adopt policies that might burden some means of
pursuing security in pursuit of a one percent chance of future tyranny?
Mere recitation of executive expertise over matters of security does not
provide an answer. Nor do (probably true) assertions that particular forms
of tyranny are unlikely in the United States.
"'1 Id. at 176.
135 See supra notes 59-66.
136 On the ambivalence of executive power, see HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE
PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN EXECUTIVE POWER 291 (1989) ("For a constitutional people,
nothing is more difficult, nor more necessary, than to define what executive power is."). On conflict
with tyranny, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 23
(1969) ("Liberty, defined as the power held by the people, was thus the victim and very antithesis of
despotism.").
137 SUSKIND, supra note 76, at 62.
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Posner and Vermeule argue that dictatorship is not possible in the
United States because it is "too wealthy, with a population that is too
highly educated.' 38 Neither institutional design nor psychological factors
are sufficient to explain the low risk of tyranny. Only the nation's wealth
and associated politics can account for the absence of executive
authoritarianism. From these claims-tyrannophobia does no good,
dictatorship is not a real possibility, the only check on executive power is
wealth and politics-Posner and Vermeuele conclude that liberal legalism
is guilty of a fallacy: "the assumption that the only possible constraints on
the executive are de jure constraints.' 39  But this conclusion does not
follow from the argument. At best, the "tyrannophobia" argument might
establish that fear of tyranny has no political or legal efficacy in checking
executive power. The argument says nothing at all about the viability of
legal constraints on the executive, or the forms that those constraints might
take. 14
0
Legal constraints, though contingently derived from a founding period
concerned about tyranny, rely on rational justifications of constitutional
and institutional design, as well as past practice. Moreover, the
tyrannophobia argument overlooks the role that constitutional culture plays
in explaining the absence of tyranny in American political practice.
41
American constitutional culture-in principle and in practice-is
committed to resolving political questions through Madisonian frameworks
wherein popular conceptions of constitutional rights and governing limits
play a distinctive role. Constitutional culture is a means of legal
constraint. 142  The unlikely prospect of the United States devolving into
138 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 193.
1
3 9 Id. at 204.
140 As Rebecca Brown argues, democratic accountability can further protections for liberty not
only at the polls, but by "involving the polity in standing behind a political structure which includes a
judicial branch empowered to step in if the majority is itself carried away by an impulse to tyrannize (a
countermajoritarian check)." Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 531, 536 (1998).
141 See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 76 (2003) ("Constitutional law draws inspiration, strength, and legitimacy from
constitutional culture, which endows constitutional law with orientation and purpose."); see also Siegel,
supra note 106, at 1342-43 ("[P]opular confidence that the Constitution is the People's is sustained by
understandings and practices that draw citizenry into engagement with questions of constitutional
meaning and enable communication between engaged citizens and officials charged with enforcing the
Constitution."). Part of this culture is to recognize as constitutionally significant fundamental legal
changes wrought outside of Article V processes through popular political participation deploying
contested constitutional meanings. See ACKERMAN, supra note 22, at 361 ("The Court's
transformative opinions of the early 1940's have served as the functional equivalents of Article Five
amendments, establishing fixed points for legal reasoning during the next era."); Ernest A. Young, The
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 441 (2007).
142 If it is correct to say, as it undoubtedly is, that "[c]onstitutional law is historically conditioned
and politically shaped," H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION
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tyranny cannot be explained without accounting for the role that
constitutional culture plays in advancing shared conceptions of constrained
institutions functioning in part to protect constitutional guarantees of
liberty. These shared conceptions constitute a collective identity in part
through the narratives and conversations about the values, rights, liberties,
and powers that constitute the preconditions for political life. 143 It is only
through these shared, yet contingent and mutable, conceptions of
constitutional meaning-relying on the wide participation of citizens,
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars-that the politics on which Posner and
Vermeule's thesis relies become possible. 144 Moreover, presidents are
bound by their need to justify their policies through the meanings a
constitutional culture makes available.
The tyrannophobia argument also conflates concern over deprivations
of liberty with irrational fears of tyranny. That persons and institutions
might be concerned to constrain executive officials from policies that
impinge on fundamental liberties does not in any obvious way reflect
"irrational beliefs" 145 about the prospects of tyranny. 146 Fear of
dictatorship is not the same thing as concern that constitutional design and
practice constrain governing officials from interfering with fundamental
liberty. Nor are such fears the same as the belief that a president
unconstrained by law is more likely to violate the People's liberties. Only
by making this further identification-that concern over liberty is also
"tyrannophobia"-can we make sense of their further claim that with some
frequency welfare-increasing policies "are blocked by 'libertarian panics'
and tyrannophobia." 147  With this identification, tyrannophobia becomes
IN HISTORY AND PRACTICE 6 (2002), it is equally accurate to say that political practice is historically
contingent and constitutionally shaped.
143 See BALKIN, supra note 105, at 126-38, 178-79; SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 4 (1988) (examining "constitutional faith" as the "wholehearted attachment to the Constitution
as the center of one's (and ultimately the nation's) political life").
144See MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS 17 (2010) ("The Constitution
matters because politics matters.").
145 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 175.
146 For example, they cite Washington's Farewell Address as an example of tyrannophobia. Id. at
175. But, Washington admonished the American public regarding the national government that
"[r]espect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined
by the fundamental maxims of true liberty." George Washington, Farewell Address (Sep. 19, 1796), in
35 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON 214, 224 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940). That a duty to obey the
Constitution is necessary for providing liberty, for example, is far from an irrational fixation on
tyranny.
147 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 20, at 203; see also, POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 3, at
155 (arguing that a government that preserves existing liberties in the face of terrorist threats "is
pathologically rigid, not enlightened, and that rigidity is at least as great a threat to national values or to
the nation's existence"). It would seem that the purported civil libertarian's fears of tyranny are
outdone by Posner and Vermeule's fears that questions of constitutional liberties might constrain
executive officials-what would seem to be a form of"libertarianophobia."
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the view that constitutional culture-the inter-generational conversation
that structures available understandings of the presidential office, and its
powers and responsibilities, through constitutional forms that constrain the
possibilities for executive discretion-would itself have to be a
manifestation of tyrannophobia. Contrary to such a conclusion, it seems
clear that American constitutional practice is not under the grips of
irrational fear, even as it seeks to channel constraints on executive power
through Madisonian constitutional forms.
In sum, the tyrannophobia argument attributes irrational phobia to
those who adhere to constitutional principles and practices that assign
responsibility for liberty to governing institutions other than the executive.
On this view, expertise over security is no different from expertise over
liberty, constrained not by reference to law or constitutional culture and
traditions, but by the political stability of wealth. At root, however,
tyrannophobia is a straw-man argument. It substitutes an emotional
state-fear-for constitutional principles and practices that value
commitment to legal constraint as a constitutive feature of the polity. If
tyranny is the limit case for how things might go badly for a democratic
republic, there are many lesser forms of executive overreach helpfully
constrained by constitutional commitments shared by citizen and
governing official alike. One need not posit irrational fear to believe that
governing form matters to function, that law is a constitutive feature of our
political practices and expectations, and that liberty is not a matter best left
to the discretion of the unbounded executive.
V. CONCLUSION
By adhering to a living constitutional tradition, Americans distribute
authority over liberty-and security-not simply to avoid tyranny, but to
embed trust and responsibility for each throughout the polity. Dispersed
power creates dispersed responsibility. More than responsibility for the
politics in which policy is practiced, citizens and courts have a role in
establishing the constitutional culture in which particular distributions of
liberty and security are possible. The social and political reproduction of
what liberty and security mean within the constitutional life of the polity
requires widely dispersed participation, even when executive officials at
times play a leading role. Because under the tradeoff thesis to decide
matters of security is often to decide questions of liberty, better decisions
about each become possible through wider participation in crafting policies
that attend properly to both. Such a conclusion is necessary because the
alternative is untenable within our constitutional tradition. Given the fact
that liberty and security tradeoff, to grant unbounded executive authority to
decide matters of security would be to grant similar authority over
questions of liberty. But nowhere in American constitutional traditions
and practice can we find unchecked executive authority over matters of
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liberty. As a consequence, we should expect institutionally allocated
authority over both liberty and security.
American constitutional culture recognizes that expertise in technical
matters of security fails to produce expertise over the fundamental matters
of both liberty and security as they impact institutional prerogatives,
constitutional powers, or fundamental rights. For these issues, who
decides on liberty becomes a way of opening up the question of who
decides on security.
